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 
Abstract— One of the most important practices of 
cybercrime investigations is to search a network traffic 
history for an excerpt of traffic, such as the disclosed 
information of an organization or a worm’s signature. In 
post-mortem investigations, criminals and targets are 
detected by attributing the excerpt to payloads of traffic 
flows. Since it is impossible to store the high volume of 
data related to long-term traffic history, payload 
attribution systems (PAS) based on storing a compact 
digest of traffic using Bloom filters have been presented in 
the literature. In these systems, querying the stored digest 
for an excerpt results in a low number of suspects instead 
of certain criminals. In this paper, we present a different 
PAS which is based on simple and widespread digital 
signal processing techniques. Our traffic digesting scheme 
has been inspired by DSP-based compression algorithms. 
The proposed payload attribution system, named DSPAS, 
not only results in a low false positive rate but also 
outperforms previous schemes in response to wildcard 
queries which are essentially applicable for complex 
excerpts such as the signature of polymorphic worms. 
Our theoretical analysis and practical evaluations show 
that DSPAS results in a significantly lower false positive 
rate and also a lower processing time for wildcard queries 
in comparison to previous works. Moreover, our PAS can 
prevent a malicious insider from evading the PAS by its 
ability to find strings similar to a queried excerpt. 
Index Terms— Payload attribution system, Cybercrime 
investigation, Transform coding, Traffic digesting. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
omputer networks are always under the threat of 
cybercrimes. No security system can provide absolute 
security. Even best network security systems cannot detect 
and prevent all attacks, especially new and unknown ones. In 
some cases, it is impossible to prevent cybercrimes. For 
example, if confidential information of an organization leaks 
via its network, how can security experts find the 
cybercriminal? To give another illustration, assume a worm 
has spread in the internal network of an organization, and the 
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Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDS/IPS) of the 
organization could not detect and prevent the worm. How is it 
possible to find the individual who spread it or to find the 
infected systems? Hence, it is necessary to have tools and 
techniques besides preventive security systems to investigate 
cybercrimes after their occurrence. This is the role of network 
forensics and its tools. 
The simplest approach to network investigation is to record 
and store raw network traffic [1], [2]. It is possible to 
investigate any network incident by traffic recording. An 
investigator can search the recorded traffic for the disclosed 
information or the worm’s signature to find its source and 
destination. This procedure is called “attribution.” The most 
challenging problem of this scheme is the storage of the high 
volume of data which is extremely expensive [3]. The other 
problem with traffic recording is the violation of privacy [4]. 
It is possible to access personal information of users by 
recording network traffic. Providing both privacy and 
network forensics has become so challenging that new 
architectures and protocols have been proposed for the 
Internet [5], [6], however, applying such changes is too 
expensive to make them practical. 
To resolve these problems, Kulesh et al. [7], [8] have 
proposed the first payload attribution system (PAS) based on 
storing a compact digest of network traffic. The system, 
named Hierarchical Bloom Filter (HBF), digests traffic using 
hash functions and Bloom filters [9]. The digest, which is 
considerably smaller than the original traffic, cannot be 
reverted to the original data and therefore, privacy is 
preserved. However, HBF can respond to a query for an 
excerpt of traffic, i.e. it can detect the flows (source and 
destination pairs) that carried the excerpt. There is, however, 
a drawback with HBF which is its non-zero false positive 
rate. It means the results obtained by HBF are only suspects, 
not certain criminals. Network incident analysts use this 
investigative tool and the provided aids to find the criminals 
who committed a cybercrime and also to identify other 
victims of an attack. 
Next studies have presented improved payload attribution 
systems in terms of false positive rate and data reduction ratio 
[10]–[13]. Nevertheless, an important problem that has not 
been adequately addressed by the previous works is wildcard 
queries. A wildcard query is a query for an excerpt in which 
some bytes are unknown, such as the signature of 
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polymorphic worms. A polymorphic worm changes its 
appearance with each instance. However, previous studies on 
these worms indicate that some invariant parts can be 
extracted from the byte code of a polymorphic worm, and the 
parts are then separated by random bytes [14]. Hence the 
signature of interest for such a worm would be in the form of 
“A*B”, where “A” and “B” are two invariant strings 
separated by a set of unknown random bytes. The previous 
payload attribution methods need to query for all possible 
values of the unknown bytes which not only takes an 
excessively long time but also imposes a high false positive 
rate because each simple query has a possibility of false 
positive response. It is noteworthy that even the intrusion 
detection systems that are specially designed for polymorphic 
worms could not achieve a false negative rate of zero [15]. 
Hence, it is essential to have a payload attribution system 
capable of processing wildcard queries for post-mortem 
investigations of such incidents. 
Another important drawback of the previous works is that 
a malicious insider can easily evade a PAS by adding small 
changes in the transferred information. Suppose an insider 
wants to send out confidential information of an organization. 
The insider is aware of the deployed PAS based on digesting 
traffic using Bloom filters, i.e. as the methods used in the 
previous papers. They have a very high false positive rate for 
small excerpts (smaller than 200 bytes). Hence, the insider 
simply changes one byte of the information (or adds one 
byte) after every 200 bytes. As a result, querying for excerpts 
smaller than 200 bytes (if they do not contain the changed 
byte) results in a very high false positive rate. On the other 
hand, querying for excerpts of the information that are larger 
than 200 bytes results in a false negative response. Hence, a 
solution is needed that can query the digest for strings similar 
to the queried excerpt. As a result, an investigator can query 
for a longer excerpt (larger than 200 bytes) and find it in the 
digest even with some different bytes. 
To resolve the problems of wildcard queries and querying 
for similar strings, we tried to seek other approaches instead 
of Bloom filter and hash functions, because the smallest 
change in the input of a hash function results in a completely 
different digest. We needed compression and data reduction 
techniques which are not very sensitive to small changes. 
This requirement conducted us to digital signal processing 
methods, especially transform coding. In this paper, we 
present a DSP-based Payload Attribution System, named 
DSPAS. Our approach, which uses simple and widespread 
DSP techniques, results in a significantly lower false positive 
rate for wildcard queries, while also reducing the response 
time. The approach can easily find strings in a digest that are 
similar to a queried excerpt. To the best of our knowledge, 
there is no similar study on network investigative methods 
and traffic archiving that uses digital signal processing 
techniques. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II 
briefly discusses related works. The proposed method is 
presented in Section III. In Section IV, the behavior of the 
proposed method is theoretically analyzed, and Section V 
evaluates the method. We conclude the paper in Section VI. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
As mentioned before, all the previous methods of network 
traffic digesting are based on the Bloom filter. A Bloom filter 
[9] is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure that uses 
hash functions for storing the members of a set. A Bloom 
filter cannot present the members that it has stored, but it can 
answer membership queries with a deterministic false 
positive rate. Bloom filters have been widely used in many 
network applications [16]. However, since our approach to 
the traffic digesting problem is entirely different, we briefly 
review the previous works, and we do not go into details of 
them. For a comprehensive survey of the previous works, 
refer to [13].  
HBF [7], which is the first traffic digesting scheme, 
partitions each packet of network traffic into equal-sized 
blocks and inserts the blocks into a Bloom filter after 
hashing. Moreover, a combination of each packet piece and 
the flow identifier of the packet is inserted into the Bloom 
filter. HBF stores a Bloom filter as the traffic digest of each 
period in a permanent storage system. For example, it may be 
a Bloom filter per hour. Furthermore, a list of all seen flows 
during each period is saved. 
The investigation for an excerpt of traffic is done in two 
steps: In the first step, called “appearance check,” the excerpt 
is partitioned into blocks, and the stored digest is searched for 
the blocks to determine the Bloom filter (time period) 
containing the excerpt. In the second step, called “flow 
determination,” the excerpt blocks are combined with the 
flows of the determined Bloom filter and finally, searching 
for the combined blocks results in the flows that carried the 
excerpt. Checking the blocks alignment and the 
consecutiveness of blocks were important problems 
addressed by HBF. 
Ponec et al. [10], [11] proposed the improved methods 
WBS and WMH which achieved significantly lower false 
positive rates at a data reduction ratio as high as 100:1. They 
used Winnowing fingerprinting technique [17] for 
partitioning a payload into blocks and inserting them into a 
Bloom filter. As a result, the blocks alignment problem was 
resolved more efficiently. 
Haghighat et al. [12] proposed the CMBF method, which 
supports wildcard queries. As stated before, a wildcard query 
is a query for an excerpt in which some bytes are unknown. 
An example of a wildcard query can be an investigation for 
the signature “A????????B” which is composed of two 
invariant strings “A” and “B” with 8 unknown random bytes 
between them. The methods prior to CMBF require an 
exhaustive search, i.e. a simple query for each possible value 
of a wildcard excerpt, which is practically infeasible due to a 
large number of simple queries (2଺ସ simple queries for the 
above example). CMBF ameliorates this problem by 
classifying byte values and decreasing the number of required 
simple queries. 
CBID is the most recent proposed PAS which is based on a 
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combination of Bloom filter, Bitmap index table and a new 
traffic downsampling technique [13]. It outperforms the 
previous methods in terms of false positive rate. Nonetheless, 
CBID does not support wildcard queries, and therefore, it 
needs an exhaustive search for a wildcard query just like the 
methods prior to CMBF. However, even CMBF has 
important drawbacks regarding wildcard queries. 
Although CMBF has significantly decreased the simple 
queries needed for a wildcard query, the achieved reduction 
in simple queries is not enough to keep the false positive rate 
low. Since each simple query has a possibility of a false 
positive response, the large number of them imposes a 
significantly large false positive rate for wildcard queries as 
shown in the evaluation section of this paper. It should be 
noted that paper [12] has not reported the false positive rate 
of wildcard queries. Moreover, the response time of CMBF 
increases exponentially with the number of wildcard bytes of 
an excerpt so that querying for an excerpt composed of more 
than eight wildcards would be infeasible. 
All the problems associated with the performance of 
wildcard queries are due to the sensitivity of hash functions to 
their input. Using hash functions means that we do not 
tolerate even small differences and it makes us perform many 
queries for an excerpt composed of wildcard bytes. Hence, 
we sought a different approach for traffic digesting which can 
process wildcard queries just like the simple queries. It 
conducted us to an approach which can query a digest for 
strings similar to a queried excerpt. In the next section, we 
present our DSP-based payload attribution system which is a 
new scheme in the literature. 
III. DSPAS 
The first requirement that must be addressed by a payload 
attribution system is data reduction. From this point of view, 
a procedure similar to the lossy compression algorithm JPEG, 
which is based on the transform coding technique, may be 
useful. In transform coding, a signal is transformed to, and 
expressed in, the frequency domain. Then, the frequency 
domain coefficients are quantized. Based on the granularity 
of the quantization which is coarser for less important 
coefficients, a portion of the coefficients is represented by 
fewer bits. As a result, a considerable number of the 
coefficients become zero, and therefore they will have low 
entropy. In the last step, the coefficients are compressed by 
entropy coding algorithms such as run-length encoding and 
LZMA [18]. The inverse of this procedure yields a signal 
similar to the original signal. The level of similarity between 
the original signal and the retrieved signal is dependent on the 
quantization granularity. 
The Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) [19] is a commonly 
used transform for this lossy compression technique, 
especially for images [20], which results in a good 
representation of the original signal with a low number of 
frequency domain coefficients. Likewise, the DCT transform, 
which is computed for the signal 𝒙𝒏 with a length of L using 
relation (1), can be a logical choice for our application. 
𝑋௞ =  ෎ 𝑥௡𝑐𝑜𝑠 ൤
𝜋
𝐿
(𝑛 +
1
2
)𝑘൨
௅ିଵ
௡ୀ଴
   ,   𝑘 = 0,1, … , 𝐿 − 1      (1) 
We used this scheme to store an approximation of traffic 
payloads. One difference between the requirement of a PAS 
and JPEG is that a PAS does not need to store a signal as 
much like as the original signal. An approximation of the 
original signal with the ability to respond to a query for 
checking the presence of an excerpt is satisfactory for a PAS. 
Therefore, we can use a very coarse quantization and achieve 
a high data reduction ratio. 
Fig. 1 shows the distribution of Discrete Cosine Transform 
(DCT) coefficients of the payload of a traffic flow. As can be 
seen, the coefficients have a Gaussian distribution with a 
mean of zero. Network traffic typically has high entropy, and 
its data bytes are, to a large extent, independent and uniform 
[21]. Therefore, the Gaussian distribution appears due to the 
Central Limit Theorem (CLT) [22]. The Gaussian distribution 
means that a small part of coefficients comprises a 
considerable part of the signal’s energy, and consequently, 
we can use the high energy coefficients as the digest of each 
payload. Hence, our solution for digesting the payload of a 
traffic flow is to remove the low energy coefficients and store 
an approximation of a payload by saving only the high energy 
coefficients. 
Fig. 2 represents our approach to traffic digesting. Unlike 
the previous methods, DSPAS does not digest individual 
packet payloads, because the payload of a packet may be 
smaller than what we need for the DCT transformation. 
DSPAS digests the packet payloads of each traffic flow as a 
whole. In other words, we digest flow payloads instead of 
packet payloads. Therefore, in the first step, DSPAS 
classifies the input traffic and separates its flows. The traffic 
classification can be offloaded to an intrusion detection 
system (IDS) since an IDS typically does this task. 
Then, DSPAS performs preprocessing operations on the 
payload of each flow. In this step, a W-byte window is slid 
through the payload and for each position of the window the 
hash of payload bytes inside the window is computed. The 
output of the hash function is a W-byte word, and the hash 
window is moved W bytes in each step. The operations of the 
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next steps are carried out on the hashed values. The purpose 
of hashing is to make values of payload bytes more 
independent and uniform. Hence, the DCT coefficients 
effectively tend to a Gaussian distribution. Moreover, hashing 
the payloads guarantees privacy protection. In addition to 
hashing, long strings of repetitive bytes are removed in the 
preprocessing step. These low entropy strings not only are 
useless for forensic purposes, but also prevent the DCT 
coefficients from becoming Gaussian. In the next step, the W-
byte words are fed into the DCT unit. In the DCT transform 
step, the input signal is divided into chunks of size L words 
and then transformed into the frequency domain using the 
DCT transform. Flows smaller than the transform size, L, 
(and also the last chunk of each flow) are padded with 
uniform random bytes before being transformed. 
In the next step, DSPAS quantizes the frequency domain 
coefficients by rounding them to the nearest integer value. 
Then, a certain number of least significant bits of the 
coefficients are removed, and only q most significant bits of 
each coefficient are stored. The data reduction ratio after this 
step, 𝑫𝑹𝒒, is equal to: 
𝐷𝑅௤ = 𝑊 × 8 𝑞ൗ                                     (2) 
Since the coefficients have a Gaussian distribution with a 
mean of zero, many coefficients become zero after the 
quantization step. Hence, the output of this step is expected to 
have long strings of zeros and consequently, low entropy. In 
the last step, DSPAS compresses the data using a lossless 
entropy coding algorithm. The number of quantization bits 
(q) has a significant impact on the compression ratio of the 
entropy coding step. Setting a low value for q can effectively 
decrease the coefficients entropy and consequently increases 
the compression ratio. However, a very low value of 𝒒 𝑾ൗ  
can drastically distort the signal. 
The investigation procedure for an excerpt is shown in Fig. 
3. First, DSPAS carries out the preprocessing operations on 
the excerpt. The entropy coding, the quantization, and the 
transformation are also inversely performed on the digest of 
each traffic flow. In the next step, DSPAS slides the excerpt 
through the retrieved payload and computes the cross-
correlation between them. It is expected that a clear peak 
appears in the correlation signal if the excerpt exists in the 
payload. The flow of each payload that contains such a peak 
is determined as a carrier of the excerpt. The peak is detected 
by setting a threshold. As the excerpt becomes longer, the 
ratio of the peak value to the standard deviation of the 
correlation signal increases. Therefore, the threshold can be 
adaptively set according to the excerpt length in order to have 
a less false positive rate for larger excerpts. Hence, DSPAS 
uses this equation to set the threshold 𝑇௟  for excerpts of size l: 
𝑇௟ = 𝐾௟  𝜎௖          (3) 
where 𝝈𝒄 is the standard deviation of the correlation signal 
and 𝑲𝒍 is a predefined constant value for excerpts of size l. It 
should be noted that setting a proper threshold is a very 
important issue in this approach. A low value for the 
threshold may result in a high false positive rate. On the other 
hand, a high threshold value can result in false negatives. 
However, detecting the peak using a simple threshold based 
on the standard deviation is the most straightforward solution. 
One can use more sophisticated CFAR (Constant False Alarm 
Rate) techniques [23]. It should also be noted that DSPAS 
suffers from the alignment problem just like CMBF and due 
to this problem, the correlation must be computed using W 
different alignments of the excerpt. 
Regarding wildcard queries, DSPAS replaces each 
wildcard byte of the excerpt with the mean of all possible 
values, i.e. byte zero, and then, treats the modified excerpt 
just as simple (non-wildcard) queries. It is expected that the 
correlation signal is not significantly affected if the number 
of wildcard bytes is considerably lower than the excerpt 
length. Hence, the wildcard queries can also be simply 
detected in the same way as simple queries. This achievement 
is a major advantage of DSPAS. While CMBF needs to query 
for all possible values of the wildcard bytes, DSPAS uses 
only a single query for an excerpt composed of unknown 
bytes. Hence, DSPAS does not suffer from a high false 
positive rate for wildcard queries. Moreover, the correlation-
based detection method gives the PAS the ability to find 
strings similar to a queried excerpt. Therefore, a malicious 
insider cannot easily evade the PAS as discussed in the 
introduction section. 
In the next section, we model the performance of the 
proposed method by a theoretical analysis to clarify the 
impact of the system parameters. 
IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, we theoretically analyze the proposed 
method and provide formulas for its false positive and false 
negative rates. 
An additive noise on a payload can model the effect of 
 
Fig. 2. Traffic digesting procedure of DSPAS Fig. 3. Investigation procedure of DSPAS 
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digesting traffic using the proposed method. Therefore, we 
have: 
𝑃 = 𝐼 + 𝑁                                          (4) 
where 𝑰 is the intact payload which is the input of the 
digesting system, 𝑷 is the recovered payload from its digest, 
and 𝑵 is the noise imposed by the digesting method. We 
experimentally studied recovered payloads from digested 
traffic and observed that their difference with original ones is 
always a white Gaussian noise, as it was naturally expected. 
For any fixed set of the PAS parameters, the system results in 
an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with a mean of 
zero and a variance of 𝝈𝑵𝟐 . Moreover, the correlation signal, 
which is the summation of independent and identically 
distributed variables, tends to a Gaussian distribution 
according to Central Limit Theorem. It should also be noted 
that as discussed in the previous section, P and I follow the 
uniform distribution 𝑼(−𝑨, 𝑨)1 where the interval size 
depends on W. For example, 𝑾 = 𝟏 results in 𝑨 = 𝟏𝟐𝟕. 
Given these preliminaries, we analyze the false positive and 
false negative rates. 
Assume S be an excerpt of size l that we are going to 
detect in the noisy payload P. The correlation signal, C, is 
calculated using the following relation: 
𝐶௡ = ෍ 𝑃௡ା௜ିଵ 𝑆௜
௟
௜ୀଵ
   ,     1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 𝐿 − 𝑙 + 1         (5) 
After determining the correlation signal, we set the 
threshold stated in relation (3) to detect the excerpt, i.e. the 
standard deviation of the correlation signal multiplied by a 
predefined coefficient (𝑲𝒍). A false positive occurs when the 
correlation signal goes higher than the threshold at a point 
while the excerpt is not present at that point. Since the 
correlation signal has a Gaussian distribution, each point of 
𝑪𝒏 crosses the threshold with a probability of 𝑸(𝑲𝒍) 
according to Q-function analysis. 𝑪𝒏 is 𝑳 − 𝒍 + 𝟏 points long 
and consequently, the number of false positives follows the 
binomial distribution 𝑿~𝑩൫𝑳 − 𝒍 + 𝟏, 𝑸(𝑲𝒍)൯. Therefore, the 
probability of false positive is: 
Pr(𝑋 > 0) = 1 − Pr(𝑋 = 0) 
= 1 − ൬
𝐿 − 𝑙 + 1
0
൰ 𝑄(𝐾௟)଴൫1 − 𝑄(𝐾௟)൯
௅ି௟ାଵ
 
= 𝟏 − ൫𝟏 − 𝑸(𝑲𝒍)൯
𝑳ି𝒍ା𝟏                         (𝟔) 
Increasing the threshold (𝑲𝒍) results in a lower false 
positive probability, which is desirable. However, when 
numerical techniques such as the correlation are used, we 
cannot discuss only the false positive probability without 
taking the false negative probability into account. The 
possibility of a false negative result is a drawback of our new 
 
1 The exact distribution is U(-A-1, A). However, to keep it simple and 
straightforward, we used the notation U(-A,A). The two notations are 
approximately equal for a large value of W. 
approach which must be controlled and set as nearest as 
possible to zero. A false negative occurs if the correlation 
value of the point 𝒏 = 𝒁 at which the excerpt exists does not 
reach the threshold. The correlation value at the point is equal 
to: 
𝐶௡ୀ௓ = 𝐶௓ = ෍ 𝑆௜  𝑃௓ା௜ିଵ
௜
= ෍ 𝑆௜  (𝑆௜ + 𝑁௜)
௜
                 (7) 
where N is an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with 
a variance of 𝝈𝑵𝟐 . Therefore, the false negative probability is 
determined by: 
Pr(𝐶௓ < 𝑇) = Pr൫𝐶௓ < 𝐾௟  𝜎஼೙൯ = 1 − Pr൫𝐶௓ > 𝐾௟  𝜎஼೙൯ 
= 1 − Pr ቆ
𝐶௓ −  𝜇஼ೋ
𝜎஼ೋ
>
𝐾௟  𝜎஼೙ −  𝜇஼ೋ
𝜎஼ೋ
ቇ 
= 1 − 𝑄 ቆ
𝐾௟  𝜎஼೙ −  𝜇஼ೋ
𝜎஼ೋ
ቇ                          (8) 
To achieve the false negative probability formula, we need 
to determine 𝝈𝑪𝒏 ,  𝝁𝑪𝒁  and 𝝈𝑪𝒁 . For the standard deviations, 
first, we determine the corresponding variances: 
𝜎஼೙
ଶ = 𝑉𝑎𝑟 ቌ෍ 𝑃௜  𝑆௜
௜
ቍ = 𝑉𝑎𝑟 ቌ෍(𝐼௜ + 𝑁௜)𝑆௜
௜
ቍ 
= ෍ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼௜𝑆௜)
௜
+ ෍ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑁௜𝑆௜)
௜
 
= ෍(𝜎ூଶ𝜎ௌଶ + 𝜎ூଶ 𝜇ௌ + 𝜎ௌଶ 𝜇ூ)
௜
 
+ ෍(𝜎ேଶ𝜎ௌଶ + 𝜎ேଶ 𝜇ௌ + 𝜎ௌଶ 𝜇ே)
௜
             (9) 
S and I are uniformly distributed in the interval [−𝑨, 𝑨]. 
Therefore: 
 𝜇ூ =   𝜇ௌ = 0                                    (10) 
𝜎ூଶ = 𝜎ௌଶ =
(−𝐴 − 𝐴)ଶ
12
=
𝐴ଶ
3
                     (11) 
𝜎஼೙
ଶ = ෍
𝐴ସ
9
௜
+ ෍
𝜎ேଶ𝐴ଶ
3
௜
 
=
𝑙𝐴ସ
9
+
𝑙𝜎ேଶ𝐴ଶ
3
 
𝜎஼೙ = 𝐴ඨ
𝑙𝐴ଶ
9
+
𝑙𝜎ேଶ
3
                          (12) 
Similarly, we determine 𝝈𝑪𝒁: 
𝜎஼ೋ
ଶ = 𝑉𝑎𝑟 ቌ෍ 𝑆௜  (𝑆௜ + 𝑁௜)
௜
ቍ 
= 𝑉𝑎𝑟 ቌ෍ 𝑆௜  𝑁௜
௜
ቍ = ෍ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆௜  𝑁௜)
௜
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= ෍ 𝜎ௌଶ𝜎ேଶ
௜
= 𝑙𝜎ௌଶ𝜎ேଶ = 𝑙𝜎ேଶ൫𝐸(𝑆ଶ) − 𝐸ଶ(𝑆)൯ 
= 𝑙𝜎ேଶ
∑ 𝑆௜ଶ௜
𝑙
= 𝜎ேଶ ෍ 𝑆௜ଶ
௜
                  (13) 
∑ 𝑺𝒊𝟐𝒊  can be easily calculated using the variance of 𝑺𝒊 
(Relation 11): 
𝜎ௌଶ =
𝐴ଶ
3
= 𝐸(𝑆ଶ) − 𝐸ଶ(𝑆) = 𝐸(𝑆ଶ) 
=
∑ 𝑆௜ଶ௜
𝑙
 
෍ 𝑆௜ଶ
௜
=
𝑙𝐴ଶ
3
                                   (14) 
Therefore: 
𝜎஼ೋ
ଶ =
𝜎ேଶ𝑙𝐴ଶ
3
 
𝜎஼ೋ = 𝐴ඨ
𝜎ேଶ𝑙
3
                                  (15) 
And the final term,  𝝁𝑪𝒁: 
 𝜇஼ೋ = 𝐸 ቌ෍ 𝑆௜
ଶ
௜
− ෍ 𝑆௜𝑁௜
௜
ቍ = ෍ 𝑆௜ଶ
௜
=  
𝑙𝐴ଶ
3
      (16) 
 
Based on relations 8, 12, 15 and 16, the false negative 
probability equals: 
𝐏𝐫(𝑪𝒁 < 𝑻) = 𝟏 − 𝑸
⎝
⎛
𝑲𝒍 𝑨ට
𝒍𝑨𝟐
𝟗
+ 𝒍𝝈𝑵
𝟐
𝟑
− 𝒍𝑨
𝟐
𝟑
𝑨ට𝝈𝑵
𝟐 𝒍
𝟑 ⎠
⎞    (𝟏𝟕) 
Relation (17) represents the false negative probability as a 
function of the threshold coefficient (𝑲𝒍), the excerpt size (l), 
the interval of the uniform distribution of input data (A) and 
the variance of the noise imposed by digesting (𝝈𝑵𝟐 ). Given 
the above analysis, we can discuss the system parameters’ 
effects: 
 
- Transform size (L): increasing transform size results in a 
higher false positive probability according to relation (6). 
On the other hand, a small transform size can increase 
the probability that a transform block does not entirely 
include a queried excerpt and consequently, the effective 
excerpt length (l) may be smaller than the excerpt’s 
actual length. Hence, a very small transform size can also 
increase the false positive probability according to the 
same relation. Obviously, the optimum transform size is 
dependent on the excerpt size. In the next section, we 
practically evaluate this parameter. 
- Correlation threshold coefficient (𝑲𝒍): according to 
relation (6), we can achieve a lower false positive 
probability by increasing the threshold. On the other 
hand, relation (17) shows that increasing the threshold 
coefficient results in a higher false negative probability, 
which is undesirable. As relation (17) indicates, a larger 
excerpt size (l) can decrease the input value of the Q-
function and compensate for the negative effect of 
increasing the threshold coefficient. It means that for a 
fixed threshold coefficient, the false negative probability 
of larger excerpts is lower. Consequently, it is possible to 
increase the threshold for larger excerpts and achieve 
lower false positive and false negative probabilities. 
- Word size (W) and quantization bits (q): the combination 
of these two parameters directly affects the data 
reduction ratio, the imposed noise and the interval of the 
uniform distribution of the input data (A). To achieve the 
best processing speed, we use the larger word size that 
our CPU supports, i.e. W = 8 bytes (for the usual 64-bit 
CPUs). It results in 𝑨 ≈ 𝟗. 𝟐𝒆𝟏𝟖. Given the 8-byte word 
size, different values of q must be evaluated to obtain an 
acceptable result. 
 
In the next section, we present our practical results and 
compare them with the results expected from the theoretical 
analysis. We also evaluate different values for the system 
parameters. It should be noted that similarly to the previous 
papers, we use the term “rate” instead of empirical 
probabilities determined by experiments.  
V. EVALUATION 
In this section, first, we evaluate DSPAS parameters to 
determine proper values for them. Then, we compare DSPAS 
results with the previous works in response to both simple 
and wildcard queries. In addition to DSPAS, we implemented 
the methods WMH, CMBF, and CBID. We collected 4 GB of 
TCP and UDP traffic of our CE Department’s core switch. 
The traffic, which was uniform at the recording time, 
comprises 76% TCP and 24% UDP flows. In the following, 
we evaluate q, 𝑲𝒍 and L, respectively. Then, we compare the 
false positive rate, false negative rate, and processing time of 
our method with the previous works. 
In the first step, we need to determine the proper value for 
quantization bits (q). We digested the traffic trace by DSPAS 
using 𝑾 = 𝟖, 𝑳 = 𝟏𝟎𝟐𝟒 and different values of q (in the 
following we evaluate and discuss L). Table I shows the 
resulting data reduction ratio, the variance of the imposed 
noise, and the signal-to-noise ratio. Moreover, Fig. 4 
represents examples of the correlation signal for each 
experiment. Although 𝒒 = 𝟑 results in a good data reduction 
ratio, its SNR is approximately equal to 1 which means the 
power of the imposed noise is equal to the signal’s power. 
Hence, the recovered payload would be completely distorted. 
It can be clearly seen in Fig. 4 which shows an ineffective 
correlation signal for 𝒒 = 𝟑. On the other side, 𝒒 = 𝟓 
achieves a high SNR. It results in a signal power 
approximately twice the noise power. As we show in the 
following, the SNR of 𝒒 = 𝟒, which has a better data 
reduction ratio than 𝒒 = 𝟓, is satisfactory to achieve 
acceptable false positive and false negative rates. 
Given 𝑾 = 𝟖, 𝑳 = 𝟏𝟎𝟐𝟒, and 𝒒 = 𝟒, we need to 
determine proper correlation threshold coefficients (𝑲𝒍) for 
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various excerpt sizes (l). Fig. 5 represents the theoretical false 
positive and false negative probabilities determined by 
Relations (6) and (17) for different 𝑲𝒍 values. As the figure 
shows, for an excerpt of size l, increasing 𝑲𝒍 results in lower 
false positive and higher false negative probabilities. 
Therefore, a middle value of 𝑲𝒍 must be selected that 
achieves both low false positive and low false negative 
probabilities. As the figure shows, larger excerpts, which 
have lower false negative probabilities, give the opportunity 
to select a larger 𝑲𝒍 and achieve a lower false positive 
probability. Considering the results of Fig. 5, we selected the 
threshold coefficients shown in Table II and used them in the 
following experiments. 
To evaluate empirical false positive and false negative 
rates, we digested the traffic trace by DSPAS using 𝑾 = 𝟖, 
𝑳 = 𝟏𝟎𝟐𝟒, and 𝒒 = 𝟒. As mentioned earlier, the digest 
achieved a data reduction ratio of about 40:1. Then, we 
digested the traffic trace using the previous methods with the 
same data reduction ratio. To evaluate the false positive rate, 
we extracted 10000 excerpts of different sizes, while all of 
them had appeared only once in the traffic. We queried each 
PAS for determining the carrier flow of each excerpt. 
Regarding the false negative issue, none of the methods 
resulted in such an outcome. The previous methods are 
naturally not expected to produce a false negative since they 
are based on hash functions. DSPAS, by contrast, can make a 
false negative response in theory. However, as the theoretical 
analysis showed, the proper setting of the system parameters 
made it practically very improbable. 
Fig. 6 represents the empirical false positive rate of 
previous works alongside the empirical and theoretical false 
positive rates of DSPAS. The empirical false positive rate is 
the ratio of falsely detected flows to the total number of 
traffic flows. While CBID does not result in any false 
positives at this data reduction ratio, other previous methods 
have a small false positive rate. The false positive rate of 
DSPAS is higher than the previous methods, especially for 
small excerpts. However, it quickly gets close to the other 
methods as the excerpt size increases, and as can be seen, the 
false positive rate of DSPAS is near to zero from 500-byte 
excerpts upward. 
As Fig. 6 shows, the false positive rate of DSPAS that we 
observed in practice is higher than what is expected from the 
theoretical analysis. There are two reasons for it. First, the 
theoretical analysis is based on perfect Gaussian distributions 
while it may not be entirely correct in practice. The second 
reason, as discussed in the last part of the previous section, is 
that an excerpt may not entirely fall into a single transform 
block and consequently, the effective excerpt length may be 
smaller than the excerpt’s actual length. As stated before, we 
use a transform size of 𝑳 = 𝟏𝟎𝟐𝟒 words (8196 bytes). 
Increasing the transform size can decrease the probability that 
a transform block does not entirely include an excerpt. 
Furthermore, DCT coefficients of larger transform sizes tend 
more to a Gaussian distribution. On the other hand, a large 
transform size increases the false positive rate according to 
Fig. 5. Theoretical false positive and false negative probabilities calculated 
using relations 6 and 17 for different 𝐾௟ values. Increasing 𝑲𝒍 results in 
lower false positive and higher false negative probabilities 
Table I: Practical evaluation of q (quantization bits) 
 Data Reduction Ratio SNR Noise variance 
q = 3 68 : 1 1 6.2𝑒38 
q = 4 40 : 1 1.4 1.2𝑒38 
q = 5 27 : 1 1.9 3.5𝑒37 
SNR is determined by calculating the ratio of signal power to the noise 
power. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Samples of correlation signal for detecting a 400-byte excerpt in 
digests obtained using different q values. The excerpt starts at point 100 of 
the recovered payloads. 
 
Table II: Theoretically Proper values for 𝐾௟ 
𝐾ଷ଴଴ 𝐾ସ଴଴ 𝐾ହ଴଴ 𝐾଺଴଴ 
4.2 4.6 5 5.2 
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relation (6). Therefore, a large transform size is not proper for 
small traffic flows. We practically examined different 
transform sizes. Fig. 7 illustrates the impact of the transform 
size on the false positive rate for different excerpt sizes. As 
the figure shows, neither very small nor very large transform 
sizes are efficient choices. The transform sizes 512 and 1024 
words result in efficient false positive rates. We selected the 
transform size of 1024 words which is the optimum choice 
for excerpts of sizes 400 and 500 bytes. 
To evaluate wildcard queries and detection of similar 
strings, we used the 300-byte excerpts and marked a different 
number of bytes of them as wildcard bytes. The position of 
the wildcard bytes was randomly selected. At the same time, 
for each wildcard excerpt, we searched the traffic to ensure 
no other match exists for it except the original excerpt. Then, 
we queried CMBF and DSPAS for the wildcard excerpts. 
CMBF uses its character classification technique and 
comparing hash values to find the excerpts in the digest. On 
the other hand, DSPAS easily finds the strings similar to the 
queried excerpts using the correlation technique. The false 
positive rates are shown in Fig. 8. As can be seen, our method 
exhibits no increase in the false positive rate while the false 
positive rate of CMBF significantly increases with the 
number of wildcard bytes. As discussed before, the large 
number of simple queries which CMBF performs for 
wildcard queries is the cause of its high false positive rate. As 
the number of wildcard bytes increases linearly, the number 
of simple queries increases exponentially. Since each simple 
query has a chance of a false positive result (according to Fig. 
6), a large number of them imposes a high false positive rate. 
On the contrary, the wildcard querying procedure of our 
method is the same as simple queries and is done in just a 
single query. It is also noteworthy that the false positive rate 
of CMBF for wildcard queries has not been evaluated by 
paper [12]. 
However, our method can result in a false negative 
response if the number of wildcard bytes increases. Fig. 9 
represents the empirical false negative rate of DSPAS as a 
function of the excerpt size and the number of wildcard bytes. 
We did not observe any false negatives for excerpts of size 
300 bytes composed of lower than 25 wildcard bytes. 
However, as expected, the false negative rate for wildcard 
queries is also related to the number of non-wildcard bytes, 
i.e. larger excerpts can tolerate more wildcard bytes. 
Another important issue is the response time of wildcard 
queries. CMBF encounters extremely large response time 
when the number of wildcard bytes increases. The response 
time was so long that we could not get the result for wildcard 
queries comprising more than six wildcard bytes. It should be 
noted that the reported response time in CMBF’s paper is 
only the response time of the appearance check step, and it 
does not reveal the total response time for answering a 
wildcard query. Indeed, the procedure for which they have 
reported a response time must be repeated for each traffic 
flow in the flow determination step. Paper [13] has 
 
Fig. 7. The impact of the DCT transform size (L) on the false positive rate of 
DSPAS for various excerpt sizes. 
 
Fig. 8. Comparison of the false positive rate of DSPAS and CMBF in 
response to wildcard queries. The response time of CMBF for excerpts 
including more than 6 wildcard bytes was so long that we could not evaluate 
it. However, it seems that CMBF tends to a false positive rate equal to 1. 
 
Fig. 6. Comparison of the false positive rate of payload attribution systems 
for simple (non-wildcard) queries. The false positive rate of each PAS is the 
number of falsely determined flows divided by the total number of traffic 
flows. 
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comprehensively discussed this important issue. 
Table III shows the processing time of digesting and 
querying for both types of excerpts using all the methods. We 
used an Intel Core i7-3770K CPU with 16 GB of RAM for 
this experiment. As can be seen in the table, since the 
computation complexity of DSPAS is more than the previous 
methods, its processing time for digesting and querying for 
simple excerpts is larger than the processing time of the other 
methods. However, when it comes to wildcard queries, 
DSPAS exhibits a more reasonable response time. While the 
querying time of CMBF increases exponentially with the 
number of wildcard bytes, the querying time of DSPAS is 
constant and suitable for any number of wildcard bytes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented a DSP-based approach to one 
of the important problems of network incident investigations, 
the payload attribution. For the first time in the literature, we 
used simple and widespread DSP techniques and showed that 
the approach has significant potential as an investigative 
method. We used the transform coding method for digesting 
network traffic. Thanks to the small size of the digest, the 
storage cost of network traffic archiving decreases 
considerably. Moreover, the digest preserves the privacy of 
users. We showed that the proposed method answers to query 
for excerpts of traffic with a bounded false positive rate. 
Although our method does not improve the false positive rate 
for simple queries in comparison to the previous works, it 
results in significantly better performance for wildcard 
queries in terms of the false positive rate and response time. 
While the previous methods are useless for wildcard queries 
because of their high false positive rate and excessively long 
response time, our approach can process the queries with a 
low false positive rate and a reasonable response time. 
Moreover, our method can easily detect strings similar to a 
queried excerpt. As a result, a malicious insider cannot easily 
evade the system. As future works, we will investigate how to 
improve the data reduction ratio of DSPAS. A possible 
approach to achieve a perfect PAS may be to combine the 
method of previous works, i.e. Bloom filters, with the method 
of this paper. We are also going to work on an efficient 
hardware implementation for real-time traffic digesting. 
Alleviation of the processing cost and trying other transforms 
such as the DFT and wavelets are also other interesting topics 
for future works. 
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